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Abstract: The financial crisis has led to new interest in the ethics of financial markets. In this 
article we further the debate on the nature of banking contracts by showing that the 
fundamental subjective purposes of loan and deposit contracts are irreconcilable. Any 
resultant mixture of the two contracts is a legal aberration. We consider a mutual fund as an 
important and legitimate alternative to the common demand deposit to provide high liquidity 
and some yield without offering full availability of a nominal sum. Besides being a close 
substitute for how many deposit accounts function today, the mutual fund has the additional 
benefit of satisfying all legal and ethical requirements. Loan and investment contracts (such as 
money market mutual funds) allow for the “bank” to make use of their clients’ funds while 
the intents of money owners are clearly classified without running into legal or ethical 
problems. 
                                                            
1
  “Lending is one thing, depositing another thing.” We thank the great 3rd century Roman legal scholar 
Ulpian for this quote from Digesta (42, 5, 24§2). Acknowledgements to be added… 
Oil and water do not mix, or: aliud est credere, aliud deponere 
The financial crisis has led to new interest in the ethics of financial markets. Many have 
criticized the behavior of bankers. But which banking practices are ethical and which are not? 
And how do they contribute to the instability of financial markets and economic crisis?  
Most recently, Evans (forthcoming) has addressed these questions by providing a legal and 
ethical analysis of the fundamental banking contract – the fractional-reserve demand deposit. 
His chain of reasoning results in a conclusion that bankers have done nothing fundamentally 
wrong from an ethical or legal perspective.  
Evans uses two types of arguments to demonstrate that a fractional-reserve deposit contract is 
legitimate. On the one hand he blurs the line between irregular deposit and loan contracts in 
an attempt to equate the two. On the other hand he attempts to redefine the concept of 
availability, claiming that the depositary´s obligation to keep the tantundem available should 
be interpreted more “loosely”.  
While we think Evans has made some important and insightful arguments, there remain 
ambiguities in the analysis. In this article we address these shortcomings. More importantly, 
we provide a guide to assess what practices banks have partaken in that have rightly drawn 
the public’s ire over the past five years.  
 
Equating deposits and loans 
In order to equate deposit and loans one has to diminish or deny completely the differences 
between loan and deposit contracts regarding the exchange of present goods and future goods, 
availability, interest, purpose, term and obligation. 
The first difference Evans attacks is the exchange of present goods against future goods in 
loan contracts and its absence in deposit contracts, where depositors gain a claim on present 
goods. He (p. 4) argues that a fractional-reserve demand deposit is also a present good if 
accepted in money exchanges.  
It is true that a bank note exists in the present, as do loan titles such as bonds. Following 
Evans’ chain of reasoning, a bond exchanged for a good must be considered a present good in 
the sense that a bank note also is. This is beside the point. It does not take away that a bond is 
a claim on future money payments, such as money in one year. There is no contractual 
obligation to buy the bond in the present but there is a contractual obligation to pay interest in 
the future.  
Similarly a deposit, just like a loan of a Rembrandt painting, both give rise to titles (e.g., a 
warehouse receipt and a loan contract) which exist in the present. However, only the deposit 
contract represents a claim to get the painting back in the present.2 In contrast, the lender of 
the Rembrandt painting gets a claim to receive his painting back only in the future. Of course, 
nothing stops the lender from selling the contract in the present. But even if he sells the 
contract the new owner will only be able to get the painting back in the future. In contrast, if 
the owner of the deposit contract sells his title, the new owner will be able to get the painting 
in the present. Deposited goods are present goods, while lent goods are claims to future 
goods. 
In general we may distinguish between regular and irregular deposit contracts. In a regular 
deposit contract, specific things are deposited such as a Rembrandt painting. Such contracts 
are called bailments in common law. In an irregular deposit contract, fungible goods such as 
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  Mises (1953, 268) states: “A depositor of a sum of money who acquires in exchange for it a claim 
convertible into money at any time which will perform exactly the same service for him as the sum it refers to, 
has exchanged no present good for a future good. The claim that he has acquired by his deposit is also a present 
good for him.” 
bushels of wheat, gallons of oil or money are deposited. In an irregular deposit contract, when 
the depositor asks for his goods he does not receive the same units deposited but the 
tantundem: an amount of equal quality and quantity. In loans we can also distinguish loans of 
fungible goods such as money or specific goods such as paintings. Most monetary deposits 
are irregular even though regular money deposits such as coins in sealed bags also exist. The 
advantage of monetary irregular deposits is mainly the reduction of costs. It would be very 
costly to store the coins of individuals separately in sealed bags. Cashier services are an 
additional advantage of irregular monetary deposits versus regular monetary deposits (Huerta 
de Soto 2009, 6). Moreover, in a regular deposit, the depositary is not responsible for losses 
due to natural catastrophes or other inevitable accidents. In an irregular deposit, in contrast, 
the depository is even responsible in the case of inevitable accidents (Huerta de Soto 2009, 7). 
Evans (p.7) does not seem to be aware of this distinction and this reason to prefer irregular 
monetary deposits to regular monetary deposits 
The second difference Evans attacks is availability. The availability of the good in a loan 
contract is transferred from the lender to the borrower, while in a deposit contract the 
depositor maintains availability fully. Evans (p. 4) claims that availability must not “reside 
with a single person” but may be shared, and supposedly in a fractional-reserve banking 
system this availability is shared by depositors and the bank. Evans here uses interchangeably 
two separate concepts: ownership and availability. Ownership can be shared, availability 
cannot.  
Two persons may jointly own a tennis racket. But there is only one who can play tennis with 
it at any one time. It is a physical constraint that the racket is not available for both at the 
same time. The dual-ownership nature of the tennis racket is not problematically viewed 
provided that each uses the racket at a different time and, perhaps most importantly, that they 
never play each other. Imagine the debate over who gets to use the racket if each player 
makes it to the final, but there is only one racket between the two of them. 
In fractional-reserve banking both the bank and the depositor think the money is available to 
them. As in the tennis example, while this dual-ownership structure is not in and of itself 
problematic, dual-availability of the racket is impossible. In fact, two parties having a good 
available to them at the same time is the root of the problem; it simply cannot be.  
Later, Evans attacks availability from another angle. He (p. 6-7) argues that there is no 
obligation for a depository to make the deposited goods completely available because access 
is normally restricted due to office hours or waiting periods. However, the important point is 
that deposits must be continuously and fully available in the legal sense.3 In our world, there 
is always a certain time lag until the depositary (i.e., bank) can honor its obligation due to 
verification issues, to the need to physically move the deposited goods or institutional 
restrictions such as business hours. This physical reality is no different than the one which 
exists in the time it takes for you to move cash from one’s wallet to settle a transaction with a 
merchant. A necessary time lag in moving money to make it available is an unfortunate reality 
(or a “friction”) but does not negate the legal obligation. 
These physical, technological or institutional constraints and their implied waiting periods, 
however, do not affect the obligation for the depositary to convert the deposit into a loan. 
Evans (p. 7) continues his argument by saying that there are similar waiting periods in 
fractional-reserve banking, as is the case when a bank must liquidate an asset to pay off a 
depositor. We maintain that the nature of these waiting periods is categorically distinct. In the 
case of a genuine deposit the waiting time is caused by technological constraints and does not 
endanger the principal aim of the contract. In the case of a fractional-reserve demand deposit 
(without an exogenous safety net such as a central bank or deposit insurance plan supported 
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  Elsewhere we have dealt with this argument extensively (Bagus and Howden forthcoming). 
by the government) there is no guarantee that the waiting period will not last forever because 
the deposited goods are simply not there. It is one thing that a depositor of a painting has to 
wait, e.g., five minutes, as the depository retrieves it from the safe. It is a fundamentally 
different issue when the depository has misappropriated the painting and sold it to buy an 
asset. Of course, it can try to sell the asset and buy the painting back, but there is no guarantee 
of success. In the first case availability is maintained at all times, in the second case, 
availability was not maintained, even if the fraudulent depositary manages to buy the painting 
back after some time.4 
Next Evans denies that the essential motivation for the deposit is safekeeping. He further 
argues that safekeeping does not require “continual availability”, and states (p.4): “When I 
leave my car with an airport valet for two weeks it is precisely because I don´t want to use it 
for a certain period of time.” His implication is that banks, like valets, do not have to keep 
available the money deposited continually available as per the safekeeping motivation for the 
deposit.  
We are sure that the person leaving the car at the airport does not plan to use it within two 
weeks, but he does want to have the car available upon his return. Imagine that the person 
unexpectedly returns home one week early from vacation. He is then told by the airport that 
they cannot give him his car now, but that he must wait another week and should not worry 
because the car is safe. We believe he would be rightly upset. The valet’s lending of the car to 
another party is against the purpose of the contract. If the car is kept safe, it will be continuous 
available regardless of the time necessary to get it out of the high security garage. 
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  Imagine that your wife and you leave for vacation and place her engagement ring in a safety deposit 
box at the bank. While you are gone your banker “borrows” the deposit, his wife wears it during a night out, and 
they return it before you return. At your wife’s request, the ring is returned (i.e., made available to her), and she 
has no knowledge of its use while she was away.  Despite being completely analogous to the conditions of 
modern deposit banking, most (if not all) people immediately see the rights violation involved in this simple 
example (Bitner et al. forthcoming).  
Alternatively, one could consider that even if the valet knew that the owner would not come 
back early and is “certain” that he will have the car available to the owner upon his return, the 
car’s owner surely does not intend for anyone to make use of it while he is away. After all, if 
this was the case we would expect that he would not pay to deposit a car with the valet for 
safekeeping but would instead lend the car to another to use and earn a payment over this 
period.  
Later, Evans (p.6) tries to blur the lines between deposits and loans by arguing that tradeoffs 
at the margin are possible. Specifically, he states that a tradeoff between safekeeping and 
availability is possible. We now understand that no such tradeoff is possible. When the car is 
kept safe, it remains available for the depositor and when the car is not kept safe it may not be 
available. A tradeoff of costs and safekeeping is, in contrast possible. A depositary that 
invests more resources in the custody of the deposited good tends to charge a higher fee for 
his services. There is a categorical difference between something being available and lent. 
There is only a difference in magnitude between the different levels of safety that can be had 
by making a good available to the depositor.  
Evans, furthermore, tries to diminish the importance of safekeeping by arguing that 
warehouses can also go bankrupt through mismanagement and therefore safekeeping involves 
“the possibility of the loss of the property” (p. 7). We beg to differ. When the safekeeping 
obligation is fulfilled then there is no loss of property for depositors even if the depository 
goes bankrupt. Consider equity deposits held by a custodian. Even if the custodian goes 
bankrupt due to mismanagement, the shares in question held by the custodian are still the 
depositor´s property and are not lost. 
The fourth distinction between loan and deposit contracts that Evans attacks is the term limit 
of loans, as expounded in Bagus and Howden (2012, 296), by criticizing the idea that a loan 
must always have a specified and finite term. While there need not necessarily be an explicit 
term in a loan contract, there is necessarily always an implicit minimum and maximum term. 
Consider the following example: person A lends a DVD to his friend B. There may not be an 
explicit term to return the lent DVD as is often the case among loans between family and 
friends, where the level of trust is high. Normally the interest is waived as well.  
There must be a minimum term by necessity so that the borrower can have some time period 
to make use of the lent good. A loan with no minimum term would hinder or eliminate the 
possibility for the borrower to use the good, a necessary condition and defining feature of any 
loan contract. In this case the implicit minimum term could be the amount of time reasonably 
needed to watch the film. 
There must also be an implicit maximum term otherwise it would be a gift; the lender does 
expect to get his DVD back at some point. This maximum term could be determined through 
tradition or convention. It could be the amount of time beyond which it would be considered 
offensive to the lender that you have not returned his DVD. Alternatively the maximum term 
could be defined as the amount of time until the pair´s next meeting.  The implicit maximum 
term solves Evans’ conundrum of ex post determined terms: “Imagine I give a friend [note he 
does not deal with a banker or stranger] some money and tell him that he only needs to pay 
back when he can afford it” (p. 4). The implicit maximum duration of the loan is the time 
period necessary for Evans’ friend to save the money required for repayment. This example 
explains the opprobrium felt when a monetary “loan” to a friend made without explicit terms 
is not repaid once the original giver feels the receiver has the ability to repay. If the giver 
considers his friend still unable to repay the money it remains a gift; once the criteria of 
ability to repay are perceived to be met, the maturity of the loan becomes apparent. 
Evans goes on to give several other supposed examples of loans without term or hybrid 
instruments. He (p. 5) cites White (2007) and refers to home mortgages and student loans with 
prepayment provisions. Prepayment provisions do not detract from the fact that there is a 
minimum term. Similarly, Evans mentions “callable loans”, which are “repaid on lender´s 
demand.” Since Evans is keen to not impose definitions on concepts it is ironic that he focuses 
on the names of contracts instead of their essence. A “callable loan” meets the economic and 
legal description of a deposit. We could just as easily call a “stock” a “bond”, but this would 
not change the essence of either: stocks are a financial asset redeemable on demand at market 
value while bonds are redeemable after a defined maturity at par value. “Perpetual bonds” or 
“perpetual gilts” are not loans without term either because the invested money is never paid 
back. These instruments are rather equity instruments promising a fixed dividend. (Bagus et 
al. (2014) consider further the economic and legal legitimacy of callable loans and perpetual 
bonds.)  
Lastly, Evans cites George Selgin´s (2010) London goldsmith example of banking contracts 
that are supposedly neither loans nor deposits. Bagus and Howden (2009) and Bagus et al. 
(2013) explain the possibility of aleatory contracts like lottery contracts, where the payout is 
uncertain. We doubt that Selgin´s goldsmith example even illustrates a functioning aleatory 
contract, while Kim (2011, 955) has unearthed new evidence showing that goldsmiths 
fraudulently used the money of genuine deposit contracts to issue additional titles.5  
Moreover, aleatory contracts are against the nature or the purpose of holding money (Bagus 
and Howden 2013). Money holding only serves one purpose: to reduce felt uncertainty. It is a 
safeguard against the uncertain future (Mises 1949, 249). In a certain world no one would 
need to hold money. Entering an aleatory contract introduces uncertainty because it is 
unknown what the payout will be. The essence of aleatory contract contradicts the purpose of 
holding money to reduce uncertainty. Furthermore, since money is a present good with no 
possibility to return a positive rate of return (while simultaneously potentially earning a 
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  Kim (2011, 955) classifies the contracts offered by goldsmiths as “self-contradictory” establishing 
“double-ownership.” He mentions “illiquidity” and “bank runs” on goldsmiths, as well as general goldsmith 
banking crises (946). Furthermore, the “coexistence of two disparate purposes” of the deposit and loan contract 
was already noted by contemporaries of the gold-smiths (947-48). 
negative return due to inflation), no one would hold money unless the services rendered by it 
– mitigating felt uncertainty – outweighed these costs. 
A survey quoted by Evans (2010) shows that the vast majority of bank clients today also want 
deposit contracts and not aleatory contracts. Over 80 percent of respondents use current 
accounts at their banks because they want the money to be available (i.e., they seek 
safekeeping and convenient access), while only 10 percent claim “because it earns interest” as 
the primary reason they hold money in a deposit account.  
Evans takes further issue with the payment of interest in the case of loan contracts while 
depositors must pay for the services of safekeeping and custody, stating: “It is perfectly 
possible for a depositor to receive interest payments, should the two parties in the exchange 
find this mutually beneficial” (p. 3). In light of the legal principles governing each contract, 
this statement is the same as saying: “It is perfectly possible for the buyer of a car to be paid 
for the purchase if the two parties in the exchange find this mutually beneficial.” Stating the 
latter misunderstands what a purchase is; to state the former fails to understand what a deposit 
is.  
Another way to blur the lines between deposit and loan contracts is to state that the 
differences just depend on definitions. Yeager (2010) maintains that defining loans and 
deposits differently would make fractional-reserve banking legitimate. Cachanovsky (2011, 
221) makes a similar argument, as does Evans (p. 5) who thinks that scholars and practitioners 
who invoke the definitions of deposit and loan “seem to be defining terms in a way that create 
unnecessary problems.” Furthermore, Evans (p. 4) also claims that the arguments against 
fractional-reserve banking “rest a great deal on the validity of definitions being used.”   
However, definitions are not valid or invalid. A theory or an argument may be valid. 
Definitions, in contrast, just explain the meaning of a term. We are here simply calling a 
certain type of contract a “deposit”. It does not matter if we call the phenomenon differently, 
such as a checking account or instant access account or even “callable loan”. We are not 
debating names but rather real entities – the essences of contracts. The essential point is that 
such types of contracts, where people deposit money to maintain full availability, exist (and 
have for quite some time) and that they have certain characteristics. Why not use the name 
they have received traditionally? Indeed, deposit contracts were not only in use already in 
ancient Roman times, but Roman legal theorists had already analyzed the implied obligations 
and pointed to the differences to loans (Huerta de Soto 2009, 20-36). Our argument makes use 
of a term which has historically been used in a non-arbitrary way. “Deposit” and “loan” mean 
nothing outside of the rights and obligations inherent in each, just as the word “apple” or 
“pen” mean nothing without reference to the essences that define and differentiate them. 
There have been and there still are deposits of fungible goods such as wheat, oil, or money. 
The use of the word “deposit” to describe them is in accordance with historically and 
currently accepted terminology. The legal obligations implied in these contracts have been 
clear since at least Roman times. Good laws must apply equally to all people and all goods at 
all times (Hayek 1939). We abide by this rule by treating the obligations for all depositaries as 
the same, namely to keep available the deposited goods or the tantundem. Incidentally, 
supporters of fractional-reserve banking, such as Evans, must explain the simple conundrum 
of why distinct legal obligations exist for some types of fungible deposits (like money) but not 
others, such as cereals like wheat.6 
                                                            
6
  There was a period in the United States when fractional-reserve grain elevators operated. The result 
was similar to what we see in banking: overexpansion in the perceived supply of wheat, price discoordinations 
and an eventual crisis when this became apparent. The only reason that banking is different is that there is an 
exogenous institution capable of creating more money titles ex nihilo, something the grain elevators were unable 
to do. We strongly suspect that supporters of fractional-reserve banking do not support central banks in this role, 
and even if they did it would necessitate the practice resulting in the same circumstances that led to a ban in 
fractional-reserve grain elevators in 1860s (Williams 1984). 
Over time governments failed to enforce the traditional legal principles of monetary irregular 
deposits. They do enforce the principles for deposits of other fungible goods such as wheat or 
oil. A special privilege is given to bankers (but not to private persons) to violate these 
obligations in the case of monetary irregular deposits (not for irregular deposits of other 
financial assets, e.g., stocks).7 The practice of fractional-reserve banking was legalized ex 
post.8 Trying to demonstrate the legitimacy of fractional-reserve banking by appealing to fluid 
definitions, as Evans does (while simultaneously claiming that this is not a good tactic for 
argumentation), fails to understand the true nature of deposit contracts and loan contracts 
(Bagus and Howden 2011). 
Evans notes that money deposited in British banks is legally not the money of depositors but 
is legally a loan owned by the bank. The general public is ignorant of this as Evans has shown 
(p. 5 and Evans 2010) and the majority of people think that the money in their accounts is 
theirs. This disconnect between what people think is occurring and what does occur in a bank 
deposit is for Evans largely irrelevant and “just one more example of financial illiteracy” (p. 
5). We beg to differ. The fact that people think their deposit is their money and believe it is 
available while the bank uses it is the crucial problem of today´s fractional-reserve banking 
system. From a legal, economic and ethical point of view these subjective beliefs are 
essential. Valid contracts rely on a “meeting of the mind.” (Bagus et al. 2013, 635). If I 
subjectively think I am renting a house and the other party subjectively thinks he is selling me 
the house, we may shake hands in agreement but the contract is invalid. If one party is not 
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  Bagus et al (2014) discuss the legal legitimacy of the practice of securities lending, which is an 
analogous case to fractional-reserve banking in the world of investment accounts. 
8  In Spanish law, Articles 306 and 307 of the Commercial Code point to a safekeeping obligation for 
depositaries including the case of monetary irregular deposit contracts. However, the law is not applied 
consistently as in practice fractional-reserve banks are not penalized for breaking the contract. It is, however, 
applied in this way in the case of bulk deposits of oil in olive mills. (Huerta de Soto 2009, 125, 129.) In Germany 
the case seems to be even clearer. Legal scholar Köhler (2013, 916, 918) maintains that the privilege of money 
creation implied in fractional-reserve banking is not only unjust from a natural law perspective; it stands also in 
contradiction to the existing private legal order. No German positive law allows for “money creation” by banks. 
“Money creation” is neither contractually agreed upon nor regulated in German civil law (919-20). 
aware of a fundamental detail of the contract, it is invalid. If people think they make a genuine 
deposit and the bank thinks it receives a genuine loan, the contract is equally invalid. 
Evans attacks the idea that deposit and loan contracts entail different purposes, claiming that 
our argument suffers from the “absence of subjectivism” inherent in choice (p. 6). He makes 
the further claim that contracts do not have purposes; only individuals do. Consider the 
following claim: The purpose of a contract of sale is the exchange of goods from seller to 
buyer for an agreed sum of money or other good. Is this statement untrue because of a lack of 
subjectivism? When the individual “subjectively” wants to maintain complete availability of 
the good, the essential element of the contract is safekeeping and custody, and the contract is 
called a deposit. On the contrary, when an individual enters into a loan contract, he does it 
with the essential element or motivation of transferring the availability of the goods in 
exchange for a payment, e.g., interest. Legal scholars agree on the fundamentally different 
purposes of loans and deposits and we are not sure what is gained by taking the tack, as Evans 
does, of claiming the purposes of any contract can be different for each side of the 
transaction.9  
As a final line of defense of fractional-reserve banking, Evans argues that “Austrian-school 
economists tend to believe that public ignorance is not a sufficient condition to ban an 
activity” (p.8).10 Thus, he acknowledges that many bank customers are not aware of what 
happens with their money, namely that the bank becomes the owner of the money in their 
                                                            
9
  See Huerta de Soto (2009, p. 17, fn. 18) for a small selection. See also legal scholar Köhler (2013, 891) 
who maintains that money creation by banks must be ended because it violates legal principles. He (2013, 908) 
considers today´s bank accounts as an example of deposits, as they fulfill the economic and legal definition of 
deposits, not loans. Köhler (912) regards the simultaneous existence of the purposes of deposit and loan 
contracts from a legal point of view as logically impossible. 
10
  Contrast this with the naivety of his later statement (p.14): “For free bankers, by contrast, everything is 
legitimate within a free market in banking.” One cannot have a modern free market without a legal system. The 
legal system adheres to some a priori and evolved legal principles (e.g., though shalt not murder; children and 
others lacking sufficient mental capacity cannot legally contract, etc). The legal principles of such a system are 
what define the free market. 
account. Herein, Evans shares the belief widespread among libertarians that all voluntarily 
agreed contracts would be valid in a free society.11  
We submit that this may be the fatal and crucial error of fractional-reserve bankers.  
In distinction we insist that there exist voluntarily agreed upon contracts that are not 
legitimate in a free society (Bagus et al. 2013). There are both a priori and evolved legal 
principles that distinguish valid from void contracts. For instance, if A hires B to assassinate 
C and later B does not fulfill his contract, courts in a free society will consider the contract 
void ab initio (as they do today). Similarly, when A sells a toy to a 2 year old for $2,000,000 
payable when the boy is 20 years old, this voluntary agreed upon contract would be 
considered invalid; the child lacks the capacity to contract. Once it is accepted that not all 
voluntarily agreed upon contracts are valid in a free society we will make a crucial step 
forward in the debate. 
In a similar way, contracts are null and void when there is no meeting of the mind. If A thinks 
he is making a deposit and B thinks he is receiving a loan, there is no valid contract even if A 
and B shake hands in agreement. Public ignorance of the fact that bankers make use of the 
deposited money implies that such contracts are void, they are just unknowingly so. Yet 
public ignorance is not necessary to make the fractional-reserve banking contract void, 
because contracts that are impossible to fulfill are also void. When A sells a “squared circle” 
to B, even though both voluntarily agree on the terms of the contract, no court would or could 
enforce the contract as it is simply impossible to fulfill. Similarly, even if depositors know 
that bankers appropriate and use their money as a loan, the contract is void. Not only are the 
safekeeping and availability motivations of the contract incompatible, but it is also impossible 
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  Of course, in today´s fractional-reserve system, banks are privileged by implicit bailout guarantees and 
credit lines from central banks. Moreover, traditional legal principles are not enforced. This answers Evans’ (p. 8 
fn 20) point that people could, as a matter of principle, put their money in a 100 percent reserve account (e.g., a 
safety deposit box). Banks abiding by traditional legal principles cannot compete with banks that are allowed to 
break these principles and receive support by governments and central banks – they receive a free lunch 
to carry out even if they were not. No good can be completely available to the depositor and 
be lent out at the same time.  
 
The attempt to redefine the concept of availability 
The criteria defining loan and deposit contracts result in incompatibilities when trying to 
combine them as one. A different tack to justify the practice of fractional-reserve banking is 
to redefine the concept of availability by using a loose definition. The obligation of 
maintaining complete availability for the depositor would be fulfilled if the depository 
invested the funds prudently or in liquid assets. A similar but innovative twist is given by 
Evans who claims that his “article intends to shift debate away from whether fractional 
reserve banking is fraudulent, to whether or not it is a solvent business practice” (p. 8).12 We 
agree with Evans that it is a very important question if fractional-reserve banking is a solvent 
business practice or systematically induces business cycles leading to its own demise 
(something we have dealt with elsewhere, in Bagus and Howden 2010a; 2011). However, we 
also agree with Davidson and Block (2011) that the question of ethical legitimacy of 
fractional-reserve banking comes first. In fact, Evan´s shift in argumentation affects the 
legitimacy question as he regards solvency of a depository as a substitute for the availability 
of the good it guards. When he writes “solvent” he means “liquid.”13  
As methods to provide sufficient solvency Evans names auditing (showing sufficient 
liquidity), the use of margins and the voluntary restriction of limited liability protection. He 
further argues that the problem of availability could be solved by calculating probabilities of 
withdrawal, suggesting that “banks are able to reasonably expect to satisfy payments as they 
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  In contrast to his introduction where he assures the reader that “[t]his response will focus directly on 
the legitimacy of fractional reserve banking” (p.2). 
13
  He writes, e.g., “If you consider a demand deposit (or indeed an overdraft facility) to be continuously 
‘due’, then all banks and many businesses are insolvent” (p. 8) 
fall due” (p. 7). He maintains that with entrepreneurial judgment fractional-reserve banks can 
fulfill payment requests.14 By using insurance and probability theory the fractional-reserve 
bank will supposedly be able to hold a sufficient amount of liquid reserves necessary to 
maintain deposit availability. He concludes that it is possible to insure a fractional-reserve 
bank (p. 7), a conclusion he shares with other free-banking theorists (Selgin 1988: 135, 1989: 
211; White 1994: 29).  
“[B]ank run insurance” (p. 10) or the application of probability theory to redemption demands 
is, however, impossible. To understand why, consider Mises’ (1998, 107-113) distinction 
between case and class probabilities. In class probability one can know the behavior of a 
general class without knowing anything about the behavior of the individual elements within 
the class. In the events of class probability we are faced with risks which are insurable 
through the law of large numbers.  
In case probability there is no general class but only unique events. Actions resulting from 
human action comprise these cases, and represent uncertain, not risky, events. One cannot 
insure a company against bankruptcy, a marriage against divorce or a bank against a run, 
because an objective calculation of probabilities applicable to human actions is impossible; 
any human action is unique. Consequently, it is impossible to calculate a sufficient reserve 
ratio to insure against bank runs. The concepts of solvency or auditing cannot modify the 
essential meaning of availability in the monetary irregular deposit contract (Huerta de Soto 
2009, 150). 
                                                            
14
  For Evans borrowing short and lending long, as well as fractional-reserve banking are legitimate as 
payment requests can be honored. The bank may be able to pay back the short-term loan and the deposit if it has 
sufficient reserves. Considering the different obligations of loan and deposit contracts, we have seen that this is 
not true. The obligation in a loan is to pay the money back at the end of the term. Maturity mismatching does not 
make the fulfillment impossible. The obligation in a deposit is to maintain full availability at all times. Using 
part or all of the deposited money does violate this obligation. 
Actually, the institution of fractional-reserve banking fosters a chain of events ending in bank 
runs in the absence of a central bank (Bagus and Howden 2010a; 2011).15 Fractional-reserve 
banks may lend funds even though real savings have not increased.16 A discoordination 
between investors and savers/consumers results. After an artificial boom fostered by credit 
expansion, malinvestments are revealed in a bust. In the following recession, many bank 
assets lose value, such as mortgage-backed securities or housing related assets during the 
most recent financial bust. Asset losses during a recession result in a loss of equity acting as a 
solvency buffer for the fractional-reserve bank. At some point depositors lose confidence in 
their banks and runs ensue; history is rife with examples. In fact, all fractional-reserve 
banking systems in history have failed and it was only the emergence of central banking 
which prevented widespread failures of the current banking system. 
Evans points to bank’s assets and implicitly redefines the availability obligation as the 
obligation to invest in safe and liquid assets: “cash reserves are not their [the banks´] only 
assets” (p. 13). Yet the asset side of the fractional-reserve bank´s balance sheet is irrelevant 
for the legal issues raised and less important still for the economic issue than Evans believes. 
As the legal obligation of demand deposits is to maintain complete availability of the 
tantundem to the depositor, its use by the depositary is illegitimate. It is irrelevant if the 
depository uses the deposited funds to buy a television set, equity or highly liquid government 
bonds. Even if the depository can return the funds at the depositor’s request, a 
                                                            
15
  Evans (p. 4) maintains that “for the purpose of this article it is not important whether or not fractional 
reserve demand deposits would … cause the boom bust cycle.” We beg to differ again, since if the practice of 
credit expansion causes a bust then bank runs become likely. On the possibility of a fractional-reserve banking 
system causing business cycles see Mises (1998, 439 Fn. 17, 570), Hoppe (1994), Hülsmann (1996), Huerta de 
Soto (2009), or Bagus and Howden (2010a, 2012). Excessive maturity mismatching induced by government 
interventions and central banking may cause similar intertemporal discoordination (Block and Barnett 2009; 
Bagus 2010; Bagus and Howden 2010b). We, however, do not regard the practice of maturity mismatching as 
unethical per se in contrast to fractional-reserve banking which is unethical as such. 
16
  The absence of central banking does not preclude coordinated credit expansion of fractional-reserve 
banks. Indeed, fractional-reserve banks can and did cooperate. Historically, interbank markets worked as 
cooperation devices (Bagus and Howden 2010a, Gertchev 2013, Howden forthcoming). Moreover, banks 
historically accepted their rivals’ notes at par value allowing for credit expansion. For the case of cooperating 
goldsmith bankers in England, see Kim (2011, 956fn15). 
misappropriation has occurred. Take a wheat elevator where farmers deposit their harvest. 
Imagine that the depository uses part of the deposited wheat to speculate on future markets 
and wins. He can pay out depositors without problem. (Even if he loses he can still pay out 
the depositors provided that a sufficiently low number of them ask for their wheat at any one 
time.) If, however, depositors discover the use of the deposited funds, go to court and prove 
the misappropriation, the depository will be convicted in all developed countries of the world 
even though he was able to pay out depositors. And what is true for wheat also holds true for 
oil, sugar, and money (in the case of non-bankers). Only bankers get the privilege to violate 
traditional legal principles. 
As a last line of defense, Evans invokes financial innovations: option and withdrawal clauses. 
Financial innovations, indeed, may develop contracts that are equivalent in all but name with 
demand deposits. It should be clear by now that we are not concerned with names but with the 
essences – purpose, intent, obligation, rights – of a contract. If the essential element of the 
contract is custody or safekeeping and not the transfer of availability, we are faced with the 
equivalent of a demand deposit. Any perfect substitute of a demand deposit must abide by all 
the same legal obligations. 
Evans names two specific constructions, namely option and withdrawal clauses. A withdrawal 
clause on deposits specifies that the depositor has to give x days notice before he can redeem 
his money. Banks may choose not to exercise the withdrawal clause as is the case with many 
“time deposits” today. Customers may regard these “time deposits” as continuously available 
to them because the withdrawal clause is normally not invoked. These instruments are then 
also equivalent to monetary irregular demand deposits. Evans even admits that “a withdrawal 
clause allows a time deposit to function as a demand deposit” (p.12). As in such constructs 
with a withdrawal clause, the depositor does not want to transfer availability and to him it 
functions as a demand deposit contract the same legal principles apply; to wit, the 
depositary´s obligation to keep a 100-percent cash reserve.  
A similar reasoning applies to “option clauses” which as Evans rightly notes are just the other 
side “of the same coin” (p.12). An option clause gives the bank the option to delay in the 
redemption of the deposited funds. In other words, the deposit can become a forced loan at the 
will of the banker. Thereby, one important characteristic of money, namely its complete, 
unconditional availability to reduce uncertainty is removed. If the “depositors” regard these 
instruments as perfect money substitutes (with unconditional availability), the option clause is 
incompatible with the purpose of the contract.17  
If people do not regard these instruments as perfect money substitutes, they become akin to 
“lottery contracts” or “aleatory contracts.”18 In such contracts you make a payment and do not 
know if or how much of something you are going to get back. In a “bank” or “lottery” run, 
repayment depends on the luck of where you stand in the line and if the option clause is 
invoked.19  
“Lottery” or “aleatory contracts” are fundamentally different from deposit or loan contracts, 
where the lender or depositor knows what amount he contractually has the right to receive in 
the future, or which is always available to him. Evans tries to deny this distinction by 
                                                            
17
  According to a recent survey (Evans 2010), most people today regard these instruments as perfect 
money substitutes or want them to be like them (they want convenient access). The same is true for the 
beginning of fractional-reserve banking. As Kim (2011, 944) points out merchants regarded goldsmith account 
notes as “ready cash.” Kim hints to the fateful decision in common law by stating: “In contrast to merchants’ 
opinion, however, common law courts regarded the bankers’ notes as credit.” In fact, as Kim notes there was an 
“exception” made in common law for banks´ demand deposits (947). As Rothbard (1994, 93) notes, in the case 
of depositaries, like grain elevators, the obligation of safekeeping was (and is) uphold by common law courts. 
18
  Hoppe (1994, 71) comes to the same assessment. He adds that these lottery tickets do not fulfill the 
traditional functions of money. Hülsmann (2003) does not use the term “aleatory contract” or “lottery ticket” but 
regards the construct as an IOU with a redemption promise. See also Huerta de Soto (2009, 711-12). 
19
  That people actually do not want the make “aleatory contracts” when they deposit money is shown by 
their reaction when they stand last in line during a bank run. They are not just complaining about bad luck as 
they would do when they do not win in a lottery or the investment fund they bought loses value; they actually get 
angry, sometimes even violent. This is so, because they “subjectively” regarded their money in the bank, and the 
deposit to be theirs: they wanted, and thought they had, a demand deposit. 
claiming that everything is uncertain. He is right that it is not 100 percent certain that a 
deposit will be paid on demand, since a bank may be robbed or that the deposit contract may 
be violated. This is beside the point. If the bank fulfills the obligations required in demand 
deposits and successfully safe-keeps the money, the depositor always has his money at his 
disposal. In contrast, in an aleatory contract the principles ruling the contract itself make it 
uncertain what is paid out, i.e., even if the seller of the aleatory does not violate the principles 
of the contract and fulfills it perfectly, the buyer does not know what will be paid to him. 
Finally, Evans (p. 10) argues that fractional-reserve banking is legitimate as “companies are 
able to sell obligations that it knows [sic.] it cannot redeem” in other cases, such as 
overbooking of flights or “bottomless coffee.” The relevant question in these examples is 
whether the obligations of the contract are fulfilled, and the legal consequence of breaking 
these contracts proves our point concerning deposit banking contracts.  
In the “bottomless coffee” contract, the restaurant has to provide unlimited amounts of coffee 
during the stay of the client, otherwise the contract is violated and the client is entitled to 
receive his money back. The same applies to “overbooking” with airline companies. If the 
airline company does not provide a seat, the client receives his money back and the contract is 
void. In the irregular monetary deposit contract, once the depository does not fulfill his 
obligation of maintaining 100 percent reserves providing full availability, the contract has 
been violated and the depositor must be returned to his original state (i.e., his money 
returned), with a court deciding if the bank must pay restitution for further damages.  
 
Conclusion, and a reconciliation 
Evans’ contribution to the debate on the legitimacy of fractional-banking raises important 
questions which we have answered in this paper. By employing analogies and examples 
Evans has tried to show that there are no essential differences between loan and deposit 
contracts. Furthermore, he has introduced a looser concept of “availability” than that typically 
used in deposit discussions. By investing in liquid and sound assets, using margins, insurance, 
auditing, option and withdrawal clauses, he claims that the availability of funds for depositors 
would be maintained.  
We show that all of these attempts fail to solve the irreconcilable differences between the two 
contracts; deposits cannot be equated with loans. The basic purpose of both contracts are 
fundamentally opposed and the differences of their distinctive characteristics remain 
insurmountable. Any mixture of the two is a legal aberration. Despite our disagreements with 
Evans, we are nevertheless very grateful for his reply because it advances the debate in 
important directions. It gave us the opportunity to clarify various issues and straighten out 
some misunderstandings. In spite of the general disagreement stemming from a neglect of 
fundamental legal principles, we are nevertheless optimistic to finally come to an agreement. 
Evans is very concerned for people that do not want full availability of their money, but rather 
want to invest it in a very liquid form that allows them a very high chance of access but not 
complete. He seems to fear that by eliminating the legal aberrance of a fractional-reserve 
demand deposit, and clearly differentiating between deposit and loans, that these people will 
be left without choice.  
That the separation of deposit and loan contracts would eliminate this option for savers is not 
true, and he himself (p.10) mentions the option of mutual funds. People can save into mutual 
funds that invest only in short-term high quality debt instruments, thereby reducing risks and 
offering high liquidity during normal times. These investors do not have a claim to a nominal 
amount of money, since the value of their shares may fall, but it tends to be very stable and 
liquid, at the same time earning some yield. In other words, those owners of fractional-reserve 
demand deposits today who want to invest their money and not have full availability, may 
simply invest in money market mutual funds, or what may be called mutual-fund banking.  
We conclude – and believe Evans can agree – that nothing is gained from a pure choice 
perspective by legalizing the inherently contradictory fractional-reserve demand deposit 
contract. Deposits, loans and mutual funds offer clear cut, straightforward and legitimate 
options to money holders.  
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